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Résumé 
L’Afrique de l’Est constitue un nouveau front pour le secteur des hydrocarbures. Les 
premières phases d’exploration ont souligné le potentiel important du Rift albertin aux 
confins de l’Ouganda, de la RDC et du Rwanda, une région qui a connu et connaît 
encore une forte instabilité politique. Le développement des réserves débute en 
Ouganda où la commercialisation est évoquée pour 2018.  
Afin de caractériser cette nouvelle implantation, d’éclairer les opportunités et les 
contraintes d’un processus de mise en valeur, une perspective régionale à l’échelle de 
l’Afrique de l’Est ou de l’ « Afrique médiane », qui lui adjoint la région des Grands 
Lacs, suivant l’expression d’Yves Lacoste, est adoptée dans cet article. A l’échelle de la 
région, le Soudan est pionnier, puisque la production commerciale de pétrole a débuté 
en 1999. Depuis 2011, le Soudan du Sud a obtenu un statut indépendant et le contrôle 
des revenus liés à la production et au transport des hydrocarbures provoquent des crises 
à répétition avec le régime de Khartoum dont il s’est détaché. Plus au Sud, l’exploration 
bat son plein, mais la production de pétrole ou de gaz reste encore très limitée : Kenya, 
Tanzanie, Lac Tanganyika, littoral de l’Océan Indien. D’un point de vue géopolitique, à 
l’exemple du Lac Albert en Ouganda, la plupart de ces réserves d’hydrocarbures se 
situent dans les zones frontalières, suscitant des rivalités entre États dans la perspective 
de leur exploitation économique, créant un risque supplémentaire d’instabilité politique 
dans certains cas. La question des transports concernant les réserves enclavées se pose 
également, nécessitant des ententes entre États, dont la fédération est-africaine n’a pas 
encore pris pleinement la mesure. 
Ces débuts d’une industrie des hydrocarbures dans l’Afrique médiane soulèvent des 
questions de gouvernance spécifiques : concernant la gestion de ce secteur et, 
également, plus généralement, concernant les systèmes politiques des pays concernés 
par cette nouvelle industrie dans leur ensemble. Ces régimes sont pour certains d’entre 
eux caractérisés de régimes « hybrides », autoritaires ou semi-autoritaires, avec forte 
personnalisation du pouvoir et présidentialisme. Il s’agit d’États pauvres mal armés 
pour se prémunir contre des accaparements de ressources, avec, en interne, peu de 
dispositifs assurant des contre-pouvoirs et ne présentant, sur un plan international, 
aucune garantie d’indépendance économique. Bien au contraire, cette nouvelle manne 
financière contribue à renforcer des logiques de pouvoirs non égalitaires et non 
démocratiques. Le cas de l’Ouganda est à cet égard illustratif de dérives possibles en 
dépit d’une mobilisation de l’opposition et d’organisations non gouvernementales. Le 
cadre juridique se met progressivement en place et pourrait servir d’exemple aux autres 
pays de la région. Cependant, le régime tente de centraliser au maximum la gestion du 
secteur pétrolier entre quelques mains à travers de nouvelles organisations de régulation 
qui lui seront inféodés.  
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Introduction  
The oil and gas industry in Eastern Africa is quite a new sector compared to the Gulf of 
Guinea where oil was produced from the end of the 1950s onwards. Though some 
exploration took place earlier on, with companies such a Shell, involved in Kenya in the 
60s or in Uganda in the 80s1, a new frontier opened up during the last 10 years. 
Previously, companies were not making much effort to find the precious hydrocarbons 
in the region. The main reason for this lack of perseverance was that oil, “easy” to get 
and refine, was flowing elsewhere at that time.  
So what has “unlocked” Eastern Africa? During the last decade, oil consumption has 
drastically risen worldwide. Today, the world’s economy needs 88 million barrels per 
day (bpd) whereas, in 2001, the level was at 77 million. China and other Asian 
economies are driving the market up by increased demand. Until 1993, China was 
relying almost entirely on its internal oil and coal production; it is now buying more 
than 5 million bpd from the international market. This recent increase of daily oil 
consumption led petroleum firms to look for new reserves. Eastern Africa finally came 
into their radar and heavy exploration began in 2006 with the activities of two minnows, 
Tullow Oil and Heritage Oil, drilling wells around Lake Albert in Uganda. In the past, 
the two concerns have known success after success and added to the market billions of 
barrels of new oil. Once more they have opened up a new hydrocarbons province which 
has led dozens of oil firms to consider East Africa has a potentially huge and untapped 
reservoir.  
Writing about oil and gas in the region is important especially at a time when 
publications and academic work are still scarce2. This paper reviews the oil exploration 
phase and the actual discoveries made in Eastern Africa and offers a prospective 
analysis of the oil sector for the coming years. It tackles specific challenges relative to 
the management of this resource in the region, such as landlocked reserves, border 
issues and governance. Though its main focus is Uganda/DRC and Kenya, the case of 
oil producing South Sudan, with the regional implications of its Independence, and 
prospects in Somalia, Ethiopia and Rwanda are drawn into the wider picture. In 
addition, new questions arise from the huge offshore gas reserves in Tanzania and 
Mozambique. Eastern Africa is understood as part of “Median Africa”, reuniting the 
Great Lakes Region and Eastern Africa3. A number of these countries are (or have been 
in the recent past) characterized by armed conflict, State collapse and very poor 
governance4. Oil discoveries have the potential to widen the ridge between the once 
warring parties, as they fight about control of oil territories. Armed conflict has the 
potential to inhibit oil exploitation and governance. However, in some instances, oil 
discovery and exploitation could present renewed opportunities for peace through the 
expansion of economic ties and political cooperation.  
                                                 
1 Reuben Kashambuzi, The Story of Petroleum exploration in Uganda (1984-2008), 2010. 
2 International Crisis Group, Black Gold in the Congo: Threat to Stability or Development Opportunity? 
July 2012. Global Witness, Uganda’s petroleum legislation - Safeguarding the sector, March 2012. 
Reuben Kashambuzi, The Story of Petroleum exploration in Uganda (1984-2008), Kampala, Impro 
Publications Ltd. 2010.  
3 Yves Lacoste, « Introduction », Hérodote, Géopolitique d’une Afrique médiane, 1997.  
4 Generally see Paul Collier, War Guns and Votes, Democracy in Dangerous Places, Harper Collin 
Publishers, 2009. 
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In this paper, we start by offering a regional perspective on exploration and production 
in Eastern Africa. Then we shall review geopolitical issues such as borders, market and 
transportation. Finally, the topic of oil governance will be tackled paying special 
attention to the case of Uganda.  
1 – Oil and gas: a regional perspective  
1.1 – The starting point: Lake Albert in Uganda and DRC 
With dozens of wells drilled since 2006, the three oil blocks around the Lake Albert in 
Uganda have already pushed this country to the rank of a major future oil province. 3.5 
billion barrels will be put in production in the next five years by a consortium composed 
of Tullow (the first company to have taken the risk with Heritage) in the centre of the 
Lake Albert region, the French behemoth Total, in the North, and one of the three state 
Chinese firms CNOOC, in the South. These three companies now have the capacity 
(both financial and technical) to exploit the oil for exportation and local transformation 
with a refinery. Yet the oil firms have rescheduled the beginning of regular production 
several times mostly because of technical and political problems, production is now due 
to start around 2018. More specifically, one of the main areas of negotiation between 
the executive and the oil companies has focused on extraction rates and whether or not 
to build a refinery locally. President Museveni defends a regional market perspective 
whereas the oil companies follow the global market trends which would lead to the 
depletion of oil reserves within a period of 10-15 years and exportation of crude through 
a pipeline. To date no Memorandum of Understanding has been signed, yet an 
agreement is under way for the construction of a 30 to 60 000 bpd refinery out of the 
prospective of 180 000 bpd production5. However, some flow tests will begin in 2014 to 
supply power plants like Namanve (50 MW) and Electromaxx6 (20 MW) which were 
revamped to conform to the use of this new type of crude. The entire process of oil 
exploration in Uganda is handled by the Ministry for Energy and Minerals in Kampala 
with a special unit based in Entebbe: the Petroleum Exploration and Production 
Department (PEPD).The Department is planning to allocate 14 new blocks in 2013 as 
soon as President Yoweri Museveni enforces the oil laws that were passed in parliament 
in 2012. More than 40 companies have formally made an application to the Ministry of 
Energy for these blocks such as the Russian private firm Lukoil, the Italian ENI and the 
Indian Essar7.  
On the other side of Lake Albert, in the Democratic Republic of Congo8, exploration is 
very slow. Three Producing Sharing Agreements (PSA) were signed in the same zone 
by three different Congolese governments between 2006 and 2010. The last contract -
the one signed by the President Joseph Kabila- was given to two unknown companies: 
Caprikat and Foxwhelp. Created a couple of months before getting the exploration 
blocks in June 2010, the companies are owned by a mix of South African shareholders9 
and of businessmen close to Kabila’s power, such as its itinerant ambassador Antoine 
                                                 
5 The East African April 20-26 2013, p. 6. Daily Monitor, 16th April 2013, p. 1, 3. 
6 Africa Energy Intelligence, n°656, 20thJuly 2011.  
7Indian Ocean Newsletter, n°1350, 15th February 2013.  
8 The DRC has produced oil since the 70s in the province of Bas-Congo. Partly located offshore, the 
fields are operated since 2004 by the French firm Perenco and currently producing 25 000 bpd.  
9 Kulhubuze Zuma, the nephew of the current South African president, is the only one to have officially 
backed the two firms.  
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Ghonda10. Without the necessary funds or the technical know-how to explore those 
landlocked areas, Caprikat and Foxwhelp have just shot a quick 2D seismic study and 
are hoping to make a profit when bought by bigger companies. The regime is just trying 
to make some money out of the contracts. In spite of prospective oil resources, the 
Congolese side of the lake might remain unexplored for a long time unless Kinshasa 
expropriates the two firms. Total, Tullow and CNOOC who are keen on controlling 
both shores of the lake refuse to deal with Caprikat and Foxwhelp directly; the two 
firms are considered as “radioactive” and too “political” for well established firms with 
boards of directors, shareholders and, for two out of three, listed.  
South of Lake Albert, prospective exploration is taking place. Total is controlling block 
3 and will conduct 2D seismic, during 2013; then based on results, it might drill in 
2014/2015. Further south, around Lake Edward, the British minnow Soco has taken 
over the very challenging area of the Virunga Park, for security and environmental 
reasons. There is still a long way to go before understanding the real potential of the 
zone, since the drilling phase might not take place before years.  
Apart from security issues with rebellion movements and a disorganized Congolese 
army, the Ministère des hydrocarbures in Kinshasa, generally bypassed by close aides 
of President Joseph Kabila, takes a long time to clear oil firms. This has led concerned 
parties in DRC to believe that the regime does not want oil to be produced in Ituri and 
the two Kivus. Even more so since the government in the Congo has not tightened its 
grip over these areas. The paralysis in Congo is in sharp contrast with the urge to 
produce oil found in Uganda. Yoweri Museveni wants the oil to flow as soon as 
possible to, among others, get rid of donors. A number of issues/contestations arising in 
relationships among various stakeholders and legislative processes and technicalities 
have been a hindrance and have delayed the process. 
1.2 – Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania exploration 
Also located in a Grabenic zone where hydrocarbons are easily trapped as was 
previously shown around the Lake Albert, two other lakes in the Great Lakes region are 
coveted by companies: Lake Kivu and Lake Tanganyika. In-between Rwanda and DRC, 
Lake Kivu has very important reserves of methane in its water depth. This gas is already 
used by Rwanda to supply a small pilot project called KP One (1 MW) sponsored by 
Kigali’s government (and in the past by World Bank). In the second half of 2013, an 
American company Contour Global is supposed to commission the first phase of a 100 
MW project supplied by this reserve in methane. When completed, this plant called 
“Kivuwatt” will double Rwanda’s power capacity of and might even enable the country 
to export electricity. As observed earlier in the Lake Albert case, the DRC side of Lake 
Kivu is not as advanced; no concessions are allocated yet. The Belgium cooperation 
plans to finance bathymetry studies in 2013 to help demarcate coherent blocks on the 
Congolese side of the lake11. Rwanda might be the first to supply electricity to the 
growing town of Goma (North Kivu’s capital), adjacent to the Rwandese city of 
Gisenyi. Oil exploration in Rwanda is at its very early stages, even though a Canadian 
company named Vanoil recently got an exploration contract around Lake Kivu and 
might conduct a seismic study in 2013. The potential size of oil reserves in Rwanda is 
totally unknown at this stage.  
 
10The Israeli mines tycoon Dan Gertler is also very often quoted.  
11Africa Energy Intelligence, n°696, 26th March 2013.  
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The other very promising area in the great lakes region is the Tanganyika Lake divided 
between four different sovereignties (DRC, Burundi, Tanzania and Zambia). In the 
North, Burundi has allocated two blocks to the British firm Surestream chaired until 
2012 by Moustapha Niasse (head of the parliament and former Prime Minister of 
Senegal) and one to the Nigerian firm AZ Petroleum. On the Tanzanian side, 
Tanganyika South has been explored since 2008 by the Australian Beach Petroleum 
whereas Tanganyika North was won by Total in 201112. Neither DRC nor Zambia have 
allocated blocks around the Lake. In the Zambian case, it seems the southern part of 
Lake Tanganyika is not that interesting from a geological perspective. As for DRC, 10 
blocks were demarcated but have never been officially offered. Burundi and Tanzania 
are in the seismic study phase. The lake, 1433 meters deep, the second deepest in the 
world (after Lake Baikal), will be hard to drill because of deep offshore conditions. In 
addition, it is landlocked. Oil companies are still studying how to cope with these 
numerous challenges before entering any drilling phase.  
1.3 – South Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia hydrocarbons exploration 
It would be a mistake to discuss oil in “Median Africa” without remembering that oil 
production in the region historically began in 1999 in the southern part of Sudan, which 
became Independent and formed South Sudan on the 9th July 2011.This partition 
happened after two very long civil wars between Khartoum and different rebellions in 
the South (two civil wars since 1955). After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA) of 2005, the two parties decided to experiment a joint government in Khartoum 
and to set up a referendum in 2011 for independence where 98% of south Sudanese 
inhabitants voted for a complete separation. Thanks to Chinese, Indian and Malaysian 
investors, Sudan managed to reach 470 000 bpd up to 2012 when litigations between the 
North and South led to a shutdown. Oil production might start again in the South in 
2013 but this sector will remain under threat as long as Juba will have to deal with its 
worst enemy to export oil. All the infrastructures lead to Port Sudan, and the 
southerners feel trapped by their geography. Very little oil exploration in South Sudan 
took place outside the current oil producing blocks. Hopes are high about the huge 
block B (118 000 km²) operated since the 80s by Total. It might be divided in several 
smaller blocks where American major Exxon, Kuwaiti Kufpec, and South African firms 
might enter13. To date, no clear strategy was announced by Juba’s ministry of oil in 
regard of block B division. Yet new rounds of bids are planned in 2013/2014 and new 
blocks are to be defined.  
Kenya is the next “big thing” according to geologists. Even if we are at an early stage, 
the wells drilled by Tullow around Lake Turkana in the northern region (Anza Basin) of 
the country are very promising. Tullow also has interests in the Omo region of Ethiopia, 
a northern extension of the Lake Turkana zone. Drilling was planned in 2012 to see 
whether the oil field spreads north. On the Kenyan coast, blocks operated by Total were 
drilled offshore, in the late 2012. Results will determine the way forward. Apart from its 
intrinsic geological qualities, Kenya’s location might turn the country into a regional oil 
hub to export South Sudan and Ugandan oil, as we shall see later.  
Somalia is also potentially an important player in the region. The country is currently 
divided into three zones: Somaliland (Hargeisa), Puntland (Garowe) and Somalia 
 
12 This block has been once more offered to potential investors in a bid which might take place in 
October 2013, according to the national Tanzanian firm of oil TPDC.  
13Africa Energy Intelligence, n°695, 19th March 2013.  
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(Mogadishu). Since the fall of Siad Barré in 1991, blocks that were explored in the 
country at the time by Marathon, Chevron or Shell were frozen and put under “force 
majeure”. With the election of Hassan Cheikh Mohamud as President of Somalia in 
2012 and the government recently put in place, advisers of the current natural resources 
minister Abdirisak Omar Mohamed are working to foster new exploration from the 
companies under “force majeure” and to attract new firms offshore and onshore. Ever 
since the 90s, Somaliland and Puntland have stopped waiting for a signal from 
Mogadishu. Licenses were given out by the government of Somaliland to well-
established companies such as Ophir, Genel (or DNO in April 2013) that conducted 
seismic campaigns. In Puntland, several small companies from Australia are exploring 
the blocks of Nugaal and Dharoor. In 2012, two wells were drilled by the Canadian 
based company Africa Oil Corp. No oil was found but exploration is still ongoing, 
triggered by the oil and gas reserves found in Yemen, where geology has similarities 
with Puntland and Somaliland. Mogadishu is trying to show its muscles and extend its 
power to the internationally unrecognized zones of Puntland and Somaliland with the 
aim of controlling oil exploration over all Siad Barre’s Somalia. Interviews with 
ministers and executives from the ministries of these zones and of the new government 
of Somalia showed that no country was ready to abandon its prerogatives and that the 
sovereignty issue is still extremely critical. Somaliland and Puntland who have more 
effective parliaments and governments than Somalia14, and who in a way are able to 
“deliver”, feel they have nothing to gain from leaving oil and mines to be handled by 
Mogadishu where instability is still critical. Overlapping interests need to be carefully 
handled and overseen by the international community currently supporting Hassan 
Cheikh Mohamud.  
1.4 – Tanzania and Mozambique gas 
Even though this paper is centered on the Great Lakes region, oil and gas interests 
extend to the Ruvuma basin on the border between Mozambique and Tanzania with gas 
discoveries since 2010. BG and Statoil managed to find 30 trillion cubic feet of gas in 
Tanzania while ENI and Anadarko discovered more than 100 trillion cubic feet of gas in 
Mozambique. For the sake of comparison, the entire reserves in the two countries 
represent approximately what Nigeria found in 60 years (180 TCF). Tanzania and 
Mozambique are going to be a major world class gas province in a position to supply 
Asia around 2018/2020. The existing reserves will allow a regular supply for several 
decades. The Tanzania and Mozambique15 economies will very soon be driven mainly 
by the gas sector, creating dominant revenue from hydrocarbons in the national income 
with expected drawbacks. Oil will also become a major sector in Uganda’s economy; 
but due to the number of inhabitants (around 33 million), reserves of 3.5 billion will 
have less impact per capita (even if they well managed by the central government), 
compared to Mozambique and the ratio of 100 trillion cubic feet of gas for 24 million 
people. Mozambique and Tanzania are on the way to becoming the regional hub for gas 
exportation in the Indian Ocean.  
 
14 Somaliland might be considered as a totally independent country with its own government since the 
90s.  
15 Both countries are producing a little gas since 2004. For Tanzania, the gas produced in Songo 
Songo Island is transported through pipelines to Dar Es Salaam to supply the Ubongo power plant 
(180 MW). In the case of Mozambique, the South African firm Sasol is handling the fields of Pande 
and Temane to supply one of their plants of Secunda in the Mpumalanga province which produces 
synthetic fuel.  
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2 – Geopolitical issues at stake with oil and gas in Median Africa 
2.1 – Border issues 
As stated in the introduction, oil development in eastern Africa raises specific issues 
which were generally not found in Western Africa. Border litigations represent the first 
issue. In this respect, Lake Albert first drew attention in August 2007 when an engineer 
from Heritage Oil was killed by Congolese soldiers while conducting a seismic survey 
close to the island of Rukwanzi in the southern part of the lake. Heritage Oil argued 
they were on Uganda’s side of the border when this happened while the Congolese 
soldiers -who had summoned the boat occupants a couple of hours before the shoot-out- 
explained the survey was conducted in Congolese territory. This specific dynamic in 
border conflicts has implications for state sovereignty. The cherished principle by 
nation states becomes even more important where oil is speculated or deposits are 
confirmed at the disputed border. No wonder that overzealous nationals and state agents 
can kill, to protect first sovereignty and next an anticipated economic yield from the oil. 
As a result of the above incidents at the border, two bilateral agreements between DRC 
and Uganda (Ngurdoto in 2007 and Dar es Salaam in 2008) were signed to prevent 
other similar conflicts. The island of Rukwanzi is now jointly administered by the two 
countries and litigation on the border demarcation is or the time being frozen with an 
explicit ban on exploring oil in a strip of five kilometers along the two sides of the 
former colonial border.  
The violent Rukwanzi incident showed the potentially dangerous choice of landmarks 
made by colonial powers to demarcate borders. In 1915, Great Britain and Belgium 
decided to take the Semliki river bed south of Lake Albert as the border starting point16. 
But just as any river, the Semiliki was shifting its course. The river has moved a 
hundred of meters in a century and the two Independent countries cannot easily agree on 
which limit to choose today (the 1915 treaty status would lead to a largely disadvantage 
DRC). A lasting solution has not been reached yet, though a bilateral commission has 
worked on it17. In the region, colonial borders, are still found to be ground for conflict 
like for instance between the two Sudan where oil is concentrated. There is also a border 
problem on Lake Malawi between Tanzania and Malawi. We can’t foresee yet whether 
the same might occur on Lake Tanganyika or Lake Kivu as exploration is still at an 
early stage. Borders can remain stable for decades like in the Lake Albert region in the 
past even though they were badly defined, yet when oil is found, border issues flare up 
easily. 
Apart from being vague and based on shifting natural landmarks, the border issue 
between DRC/Uganda on Lake Albert was plagued by a very complicated bilateral 
relationship ever since the first Congolese war of 1996/1997. Many similar cases were 
handled in a peaceful manner for instance along the border between Tunisia and Libya, 
or Senegal and Bissau Guinea, or Nigeria and Sao Tomé & Principe. But in this case the 
difference is that Uganda and Congo did not have much interaction before trying to 
solve the border issue tied to oil exploration. Moreover, in the case of Uganda, oil had 
already been found whereas in all the cases previously quoted, exploration was still at 
an early phase. After a first Congolese war where Uganda and Rwanda fought next to 
                                                 
16 Benjamin Augé, Hydrocarbons tied with border conflicts in the great lakes region of Africa, 
Governance of Oil in Africa, Unfinished Business, Institut Français des Relations Internationales, La 
documentation Française, 2009, Paris. pp. 165-193. 
17 Benjamin Augé, Ibid.  
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Laurent Désiré Kabila to take over power in Kinshasa from the hands of Mobuto Sese 
Seko (1996/1997), the second Congolese war (1998-2003) led by Laurent Désiré Kabila 
(1997-2001) and then his son Joseph Kabila (since 2001) was fought against Ugandan 
and Rwandan armies and proxies. After this war, other rebellions were allegedly 
supported by Uganda and Rwanda like the CNDP (Congrés national pour la defense du 
people) of Laurent Nkunda and even more recently the M23 of Bosco Ntaganda (now 
facing the international court in The Hague). This turbulent recent history has nourished 
deep suspicions between neighbors. It contributed to create border problems and led to 
the August 2007 murder. A cable leaked in 2010 by Wikileaks highlighted that 
presidents Kabila and Museveni were getting along well but that the Congolese 
population which has endured years of conflict (and still does), in which Uganda and its 
proxies play a role, is encountering difficulties to recover from this endless insecurity18.  
Apart from Lake Albert, similar border conflicts and litigations might occur in the Lake 
Kivu and Lake Tanganyika regions between DRC and its neighbors. The biggest fear 
concerns Lake Kivu, where massive distrust and suspicion exist between civil servants 
in the ministry of hydrocarbons in Kinshasa and their counterparts in Kigali, as well 
between the armies. The alleged “stealing” of gas by Rwanda could always be used by 
DRC politicians as a motive for conflict between the two countries. Conflict doesn’t 
necessarily mean war; it might also lead to tension and escalation of words with 
consequences on the ground such as anger towards specific communities. In the case of 
Lake Tanganyika, tensions might not flare up as violently as Tanzania remains a main 
actor for peace in the region; Benjamin Mkapa and Jakaya Kikwete have persistently 
played the role of mediators in the great lakes region ever since the first Congolese war. 
This of course doesn’t imply that oil exploration will remain peaceful; it might also 
bring up suspicion between politicians and civil servants in charge of oil from both 
sides.  
2.2 – Market and transport 
Based on current knowledge in the geology of the region and thanks to exploration 
campaigns, only one zone in Eastern Africa has potentially enough oil for organized 
production: the Ugandan side of Lake Albert. Kenya and Ethiopia are still at an early 
stage of exploration, as well as Burundi and Rwanda. Uganda is facing the same 
dilemma for oil as Tanzania and Mozambique are facing for gas about the splitting of 
the resource between local needs and exportation. The already known reserves around 
Lake Albert allow oil companies executives to forecast a “plateau production” around 
250 000/300 000 bpd (for at least two decades). By mid-April 2013, the Ugandan 
president, Yoweri Museveni, had managed to convince oil firms to make 30 000 bpd of 
crude available for a refinery that would be built in the eastern district of Hoima19. 
Tullow, Total and CNOOC fought a fierce battle against Museveni who was originally, 
demanding a regional refinery of 150 000 to 200 000 bpd. Museveni was finally 
convinced that a regional plant would not be profitable for investors due to the 
competition of the Mombasa plant20. Still he insisted the Hoima plant will later expand 
to 60,000 bpd to meet with local consumption increase. Uganda now has to seek for 
 
18 Benjamin Augé, Produire du pétrole en zone de conflit: cas de l’Afrique médiane, PhD 2012, Paris 8 
University, p. 277.  
19Africa Energy Intelligence, n°697, 16th April 2013. Daily Monitor, 16th April 2013.  
20 Currently the Mombasa refinery, in a position to refine half the needs of Kenya, is in financial trouble 
and operating at half capacity. The building of a new refinery is planned. The East African, May 4-10 
2013, p.4.  
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funds for the plant and investors willing to operate it (the Russian and Chinese are 
already on the list). Oil companies and governments also have to agree on another 
sensitive issue: which route for the exportation pipeline? There are three different routes 
studied since 2010: Mombasa, Lamu and Dar es Salaam. The easiest way is definitely 
Mombasa, an oil pipeline already exists from Mombasa to Eldoret -and plans for its 
extension to Kisumu are already under way- and supplies refined products to Kenya and 
Uganda by road from Eldoret. In the event that Mombasa is chosen as the export port, a 
new pipeline would be built from Hoima to Eldoret and then would double the current 
one to reach Mombasa where necessary infrastructures are already in place. This choice 
is evaluated at around 3.5 billion dollars by Total21. A dual way carriage pipeline, meant 
to bring petroleum products and to send crude oil, is already in its bidding phase in the 
Ministry for Energy in Kampala22. The second route under study would lead to Lamu in 
Kenya (close to the Somali border). This would be an expensive decision as there is 
almost no infrastructure constructed yet in Lamu23. In addition, land acquisitions for the 
entire 1490 kilometers pipeline will need to be negotiated24, whereas for Mombasa, half 
the way is already covered by the other petroleum products pipeline. In spite of this, 
Total foresees that this choice would cost less than the Mombasa route: only 3 billion 
dollars. Initial work has begun in Lamu in 2012, yet up to now, no funds are available 
for a deep port and an oil terminal (Qatar planned to invest in 2007, but nothing came 
out of the plan). The last choice, by far the longest (more than 1600 kilometers) and also 
the most expensive, about 4 billion dollars, is Dar es Salaam. The final decision will be 
made in 2013.  
There are constellations of issues that arise in choices of the market for oil, whether or 
not to market refined or crude oil, and the mode of transport for the product. The 
discussions haggle over these issues among the stakeholders is a reassertion of specific 
leverages on each part; to ensure that the resulting option produces more benefit to 
them.25 Such capitalist motivated assertions of positions will always be of currency in 
the oil sector in “Median Africa”, with relatively poor and land-locked countries 
struggling to strategically position themselves to benefit from the finite resource. On the 
other hand are found profit-motivated companies, with a similar agenda. 
 
  
 
21 All figures of pipelines cost can be found in Africa Energy Intelligence, n°696, 2nd April 2013.  
22 As indicated in discussions with civil servants of the Ministry, March 2013. 
23 Le Monde Diplomatique, April 2013.  
24 Benjamin Augé, Produire du pétrole en zone de conflit : cas de l’Afrique médiane, doctorat de 
géographie, Paris 8, 2012.  
25 Uganda believes that having a refinery at home will mean saving on transport costs, fetching more 
from oil, and also be in position to use the by-products from the refining processes. 
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3 – Oil Governance in Eastern Africa and Uganda 
 
In Eastern Africa, oil governance represents a real challenge. In 2012, five western 
bilateral donors stopped their financial aid after the office of the Prime Minister 
mismanaged 13 million dollars26 which were channeled for reconstruction programs in 
the previously war-torn northern Uganda. Investing massively in oil, gas and mining 
industries in a country with limited financial grounding and past expertise in the 
extractive sector is a risky endeavor which creates new governance issues. When high 
democratic standards are not in place before these sectors become dominant in the 
economy, there is likelihood that massive investments in mining would worsen the 
fragile political and economic situation of the country. No improvement in governance 
was noted thanks to oil sector in Equatorial Guinea, Sudan, Chad and Niger recently. 
But in the case of Ghana, where oil production started in 2010, some hope remains 
thanks to high democratic standards (two strong parties alternating in power since 1992) 
which enabled debates on how to manage the sector, and how to channel the money to 
avoid corrupt practices.  
In Uganda, the next country in line for oil production in Eastern Africa, there are more 
and more concerns about the political, financial, economic, social and environmental 
situation, and also management of expectations. Government’s official dream as seen in 
the National Oil and Gas Policy for Uganda 2008 is to manage the finite resource to 
contribute to society by eradicating poverty. Corruption scandals that have mired the oil 
sector and high levels of secrecy are indicative of self-interests; garner as much as 
possible from the sector for self. Yet, the high expectations of people in the region, the 
country’s smaller centers of power/ political/administrative units such as districts and 
cultural institutions, seeking to claim a stake of entitlement to the revenues from the 
sector, have not been well managed. The hallmark of this is a lack of consensus at the 
country level, and revealing sign that consensus at a wider regional level with even 
more social and political stakeholders with diverse interests on these issues could be 
mythical. 
One of the main issues to tackle is the financial and speculative dimension of oil 
development and link to corruption found at all levels, from speculative transactions in 
oil contracts to land-grabbing, speculative land deals, creation and transfer of titles. For 
instance, in Uganda just as in DRC, powerful stakeholders in government started by 
making money from contracts27. The State reacted by making efforts to gain from taxes, 
yet having to face the financial cost of a legal battle (high cost of court case with 
Heritage), Tullow has agreed to pay the government and in turn is suing Heritage. 
The legal and policy framework in Uganda thus far is not strong enough to unseat the 
political and other ‘imperatives’ of government and other key players in the sector. In a 
sector of this nature, transparency, accountability and public empowerment to take part 
in decisions are among the legion key issues of governance.28 The public needs 
information, in order to demand for accountability. The legal framework, say the 
                                                 
26 The Independent, October 26- November 01 2012, p. 10-12. 
27 For instance, see the case of Heritage - linked to the President’s half brother - selling to Tullow. 
http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Data/Africa_file/Company/uganda01.html. 
28 See J. Oloka Onyango et al., How Much do we really know? Decentralization, access to information 
and improving accountability in Uganda. Human Rights and Peace Center Working paper No.28 June, 
2010. 
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Constitution of Uganda 1995, article 41 (1) and Access to Information Act29 section 5, 
stipulates it is everyone’s right to seek information from the state or any of its organs; 
unless the security of the state will be prejudiced or someone’s privacy is likely to be 
interfered with. This right is also catered for within the spectrum of environmental 
protection.30 The Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act31 section 59 to some 
extent contradicts the preceding laws. According to that section, with a few exceptions 
in clause 2, information furnished by a licensee cannot be disclosed without consent of 
the licensee except to a Government Minister or an officer in the public service. It was 
on the basis of some of the above that information in the Production Sharing 
Agreements (PSA) was kept top secret from the public until intense pressure from 
Parliament. Institutions such as Parliament and Civil Society Organizations like 
Advocates Coalition for Development (ACODE) have had principle-driven fights in the 
oil processes of legislation in Uganda, in the public’s interest. The highly politicised 
parliamentary debates on oil in October 2011 have clearly shown that the President was 
keeping the sector under close control. None of the demands formulated by opposition 
MPs were taken into account in the Petroleum (Exploration, Development and 
Production) Bill32. The invisible arm of political control over processes in the oil sector 
is seen in some incidents, such as the case of Twinobusingye Severino v. Attorney 
General33, in which an advocate from Hon. Amama Mbazizi’s constituency successfully 
challenged a resolution of Parliament setting up an ad hoc Committee to, among others, 
investigate bribery claims and requiring the concerned ministers: Hon. Amama Mbabazi 
(Prime Minister of Uganda), Hon Sam K. Kutesa (Minister of Foreign Affairs), and Hon 
Hillary Onek (Minister of Internal Affairs) to “step aside” from their offices in the 
interim. This case filed by Twinobusingye, also an NRM supporter, ended with an 
award of a hefty and contested sum of 2.9 Billion Uganda shillings in costs from 
government!34 The contestations sent shivers into the National Resistance Movement 
(NRM), Museveni’s party, where out-spoken and critical leaders, such as Theodore 
Ssekikubo who led the debates in parliament, were finally expelled from the party.35 
Advocates Coalition for Development (ACODE) were among the civil society 
organizations fighting against the licensing powers given to the Minister under the 
Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Bill. In disregard of their role, 
former Energy Minister Hillary Onek was always emphatic that NGOs had no business 
with oil but only with taking care of orphans; they needed permission by the Ministry to 
engage in any research or work in the oil region about oil.36 Following its sponsorship 
of a workshop for Parliamentarians on the oil laws, ACODE was warned by the 
president, promised deregistration and Bank of Uganda ordered for a record of all its 
accounts.37 Suffocation of the civil society that normally speaks for the public leaves 
only the government and its self-seeking individuals in charge. The nomination, in 
2011, of Irene Muloni (a specialist of electricity) as the Cabinet Minister for Energy and 
Minerals is also worrisome. She has no clear vision of how to manage the oil sector. Oil 
matters are mainly driven by the Permanent Secretary of the ministry of Oil and 
 
29 No. 6 of 2005, came into force 20th April 2006. 
30 National Environmental Act Cap. 153, 200 Laws of Uganda, section 86. 
31 Chapter 150 Laws of Uganda. 
32 Now the Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Act 2013, that commenced on April 
5th, 2013, repealing the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act, Cap 150. 
33 Constitutional Petition No.47 of 2011. 
34 See “Shs 13 Billion costs would be crazy”, Observer (Editorial) February 27, 2013, p.8. 
35Daily Monitor, 16th April 2013, p.4, 5.  
36 Haggai Matsiko, “ACODE under investigation”, The Independent, April 06-09 2012. 
37 Haggail Matsko, ibid.  
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Minerals, Kaliisa Kabagambe, who has worked in the ministry since in the late 70s and 
Ernst Rubondo, the commissioner of Petroleum Exploraiton and Production Department 
(PEPD) based in Entebbe. Kaliisa has a direct relationship with Museveni which points 
at the personal involvement of the president in decisions regarding the oil sector which 
bypasses existing institutional frameworks, showing the wrong signal for the future 
management of the oil revenue. There is a clear personalization of the regime and 
presidentialization of the oil sector in Uganda.  
The prospective view on the environmental and ecological management of the oil 
exploitation is not impressive, taking into account that one of the main areas of future 
production is located in Murchison Falls Park, a Ramsar site, recognized internationally 
for its importance and value. The investment Code Act38 92 requires that an investment 
for which a license is issued should not be a danger to the environment or the ecology. 
The National Environment Management Authority (NEMA), as the central body in 
charge of environment licensed companies, to look into the management of oil waste; 
those mandated include CNOOC Uganda limited, Epsilon and Hariss International.39 
The oil companies have not procured the services of these companies to treat their 
wastes, at the time of writing. There have been media reports on the failure of oil 
companies to treat the waste from their activities so far. Lots of mud cuttings are at the 
moment in open spaces and heaps on the ground, only covered with polythene, and 
liquid waste in open concrete pits without any kind of treatment. If the situation is 
precarious before the oil drilling starts, it is unrealistic to hope for better after it has 
started. In the absence of imminent compulsion from laws or policies to do good and the 
fact that imperative of Corporate Social Responsibility is not yet deeply rooted, the 
communities are at a risk of consequences of environmental degradation from oil 
activities. 
Also, the Albertine region of Uganda is experiencing an increasing number of 
contestations on land; the powerful displacing the poor with little or no compensation, 
disputes between and among the poor over land.40 This is against the backdrop that land 
governance in Uganda, in the recent times characterised by disregard of institutions 
provided for by law to handle such disputes in favor of political options. An example is 
the appointment of a Committee headed by junior State Minister for lands; Aida 
Nantaba, to decide disputes over land; in many occurrences operating outside of the 
law.41 
So many issues have arisen in the oil sector in Uganda so far, but a paucity of success 
stories in the legal, policy and other frameworks intended to address them. Rather, 
power has developed in a way to lend credence to politically motivated and self-
interested discourses of individuals; over those of the public. This does not provide a 
strong (but only a shaky) ground, upon which regional initiatives can be constructed. 
Instead it presents more skeletons that could haunt optimistic speculation for the future 
of oil in the great lakes region. 
 
38 Chapter 92 Laws of Uganda, section 18 (2) (d). 
39 Daily Monitor, April 16, 2013, p. 6. 
40 See: Chris Musiime, The Great Land Rush, OIL in Uganda, August 2012, Issue 2 and 3. (Note that 
this issue contains more articles on land wrangles in the region). 
41 See, President Museveni Freezes State House Land Unit Activities, available at 
http://newsuganda.ug/news/latest/uganda-news-picks/president-museveni-freezes-state-house-land-
unit-activities/56q1.91337, accessed May 27, 2013. 
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On the other side of the border, in DRC, the minister of hydrocarbons has no power at 
all, all decisions, which are rare, are taken by advisers of the president (the most 
influential ones are not always the ones officially appointed). The main difference 
between DRC and Uganda is that Yoweri Museveni is able to enforce decisions he takes 
and that the link with the Permanent secretary is very efficient as long as there is no 
difference of view with the oil companies. On the contrary, there are numerous actors in 
the DRC who are working against each other: appointed advisers against informal 
advisers in the presidency, the minister against civil servants in the ministry, the 
national oil corporation, Cohydro, against all the other bodies. The disorganization of 
the oil sector in DRC is also reflected in the never ending process of rebuilding a nation 
in which state institutions are not meant to serve the interests of private individuals but 
serve the wider interests of a nation.  
In the case of the other previously mentioned countries in the region, it is not easy to 
give a prospective analysis, as we are still at an early exploration phase. The activities 
are not yet considered as the “golden sector to capture for Presidents and regimes” since 
reserves need yet to be confirmed. In Kenya, the choice of the Minister for Energy by 
the newly elected leaders Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto is revealing. Davis 
Chirchir, the secretary-general of the United Republican Party (URP) of William Ruto 
and the architect of the alliance between the URP and Kenyatta’s The National Alliance 
(TNA) was chosen, late April 2013. This constitutes a political appointment42. Kenyatta 
favored a close ally of his Vice-president to a specialist of the oil sector. In Tanzania, in 
May 2012, in a move which was viewed positively, president Kikwete decided to 
appoint a geologist, Sospeter Muhongo, previously a professor at the University of Dar 
es Salaam, as Minister for energy and minerals. In turn, the Professor chose an 
experienced geologist, Sosthenes Massola, as his closest adviser. The previous Minister 
for Energy, William Ngeleja, was an experienced politician with no specific knowledge 
about the sector. Conversant with oil issues, the new minister has no electoral 
constituency to cater for. Until now, Professor Muhongo is working on a gas master 
plan. Yet, it is still too early to see the outcome of these two contrasting decisions in 
Kenya and Tanzania.  
Awareness of issues at stake in the development of an oil sector requires technical 
knowledge. Yet conflicting interests are arising and need political solutions and 
mediation skills. Legal frameworks are in place or are still to be worked out, but without 
political goodwill and the strengthening of governing institutions, a departure from 
personal power, they will remain ineffective. 
 
42Africa Energy Intelligence, n°698, 30th March 2013.  
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Conclusion  
This paper aimed at giving a brief overview of the oil exploration and production (in the 
Eastern and Great Lakes region of Africa) where each country has its own trajectory. 
Ever since 2006 and the first discoveries, Uganda set the pace and now the entire region 
has become a hotspot for oil exploration. More reserves are yet to be found in the 
Kenyan and Ethiopian region of Lake Turkana and offshore along the coast of Kenya, 
Tanzania and Mozambique. This new industry might be a blessing or a curse for 
Uganda. The planned growth of the national GDP might suffer a setback with organized 
thieving. Several challenges need to be addressed in Uganda. The major one has to do 
with the financial implications of the oil development, the need for investments but also 
the need to tame high expectations, speculation and corrupt deals. The second one deals 
with the low level of technical expertise in oil. The third concerns the environment and 
its protection, with communities depending on fish, agriculture and livestock for 
livelihoods in areas concerned by oil production and also the importance of the area of 
Murchison Park as a biodiversity hotspot. 
From a governance perspective, there is an institutional vacuum and a need to create 
specific bodies to handle the sector: regulatory bodies, state oil companies and a strong 
and independent ministry of oil and energy. These bodies need a degree of autonomy 
and highly skilled civil servants, a difficult target to attain especially when oil and 
potential wealth attract interest from all starting from the top. Generally, presidents get 
personally involved in oil decisions. Moreover, to be efficient and able to make proper 
decisions, people in government, need adequate training and exposure. Parliament for 
instance has an important role to play in regulating the oil sector. Norway is closely 
involved in such trainings in Uganda as in many other African countries. Norway has 
been successful in making these trainings available upon request from African states 
and not, as in the case of the World Bank, as a condition to get access to soft loans. Yet 
considering the political landscape and direct interest of the powerful in the oil sector, 
knowledge of the players might (by itself) be insufficient to slough off pressure to 
support strategic positions of the powerful in oil management. 
Eastern Africa is plagued by border litigations and shared oil or gas reserves might 
create new ones in the near future. Yet, through economic interdependency, shared oil 
and gas reserves might also start a new era of cooperation. The episode of Lake Albert 
in 2007 between DRC and Uganda forced the two “enemies” to talk on borders but also 
on many other subjects during the Ngurdoto and Dar es Salaam treaties. These talks 
have drastically lowered the suspicion between high ranking civil servants and also 
pushed for better coordination between the two armies. In the future, when DRC finds 
oil on its side of the Lake, exports are likely to go through Ugandan territory. In 
contrast, levels of distrust remain high between DRC and Rwanda, over the control of 
methane in Lake Kivu and this does not speak well about the future. Currently, endless 
discussions in Kampala on the M23 crisis seem to give more credibility to a lasting 
conflict between the two enemies of the 1998/2003 war. When shared between several 
countries, Management of oil resources might be used as a barometer to measure 
existing ties and relationships and their vulnerability. Due to the geography and to the 
history of conflicts, as well as individual state trajectories, the regional management of 
oil resources and infrastructures is especially challenging.  
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